In the months leading up to the TPLF invasion of Somalia last December, this blog along with many others declared that no peace could come of such an adventure. We clearly stated that the true nature of the act was to neutralize all perceived enemies of the Ethiopian regime. These included “an alliance of armed groups in Ethiopia [… such as OLF, ONLF, EPPF, etc…], unarmed groups [such as Kinijit], Eritrea and Somalia's ICU…” [RE, December 28, 2006]. In fact the whole strategy had been crystallizing since October when we claimed that Meles “… has done all that is in his power to provoke the Somalis to declare war on Ethiopia with the same [as Mengistu’s in 1977] hopes of gaining domestic legitimacy and external military support…” [RE, October 10, 2006].
Since then scores of Ethiopians even remotely associated with the internal opposition have been jailed or made to disappear. Furthermore, hundreds of thousands of Somali civilians have been imprisoned, displaced, executed and tortured. Most importantly the US has been lured into an unwinnable battle to impose warlords on Somalia when the population has so clearly rejected it. Various media outlets and human rights organizations have declared the Joint Ethio/US military action illegal and verging on war crimes. At a regional level this war has also destabilized Kenyan security by dragging that country into the fray while delegitimized the AU and Uganda by forcing them to rescue Meles’ military mistake by sending their soldiers to replace his.
In short the Meles strategy of drawing strategic political and military support from the US has worked [albeit with much opposition within the US] while he has seen very modest success on the home front. It may actually be argued that the impact of his actions on internal dissent have been negative by forcing him to lose control of Ogaden [see attacks on economic and military installations]. His military is overstretched, his diplomatic initiatives are faltering and he has now lost not only domestic but regional and international legitimacy. Finally, Somalia is now completely destroyed again, which may quite possibly have been his intent all along, without him having gained the expected support from Christian Ethiopian constituencies as a result. More dangerous for him is that he has now inadvertently stimulated a united Somali front against Ethiopian intervention.
The recent sudden ‘guilty’ ruling on opposition leaders is probably better understood in this light. Finding success fleeting on all fronts, the regime may have forced the ruling as an external show of strength on the only ‘enemy’ that it controls. But there is one more card up Meles’ sleeve. Being the MBA that he is, he knows that all bad news can never be good for business. Distracting Ethiopians and the international community with large expensive and year-long Millennium parties is now crucial. Mengistu attempted such a distraction with a large celebration of the tenth anniversary of the revolution, thereby setting off his own demise. Is Meles so inspired by Mengistu’s old strategies that he will do the same?
Since then scores of Ethiopians even remotely associated with the internal opposition have been jailed or made to disappear. Furthermore, hundreds of thousands of Somali civilians have been imprisoned, displaced, executed and tortured. Most importantly the US has been lured into an unwinnable battle to impose warlords on Somalia when the population has so clearly rejected it. Various media outlets and human rights organizations have declared the Joint Ethio/US military action illegal and verging on war crimes. At a regional level this war has also destabilized Kenyan security by dragging that country into the fray while delegitimized the AU and Uganda by forcing them to rescue Meles’ military mistake by sending their soldiers to replace his.
In short the Meles strategy of drawing strategic political and military support from the US has worked [albeit with much opposition within the US] while he has seen very modest success on the home front. It may actually be argued that the impact of his actions on internal dissent have been negative by forcing him to lose control of Ogaden [see attacks on economic and military installations]. His military is overstretched, his diplomatic initiatives are faltering and he has now lost not only domestic but regional and international legitimacy. Finally, Somalia is now completely destroyed again, which may quite possibly have been his intent all along, without him having gained the expected support from Christian Ethiopian constituencies as a result. More dangerous for him is that he has now inadvertently stimulated a united Somali front against Ethiopian intervention.
The recent sudden ‘guilty’ ruling on opposition leaders is probably better understood in this light. Finding success fleeting on all fronts, the regime may have forced the ruling as an external show of strength on the only ‘enemy’ that it controls. But there is one more card up Meles’ sleeve. Being the MBA that he is, he knows that all bad news can never be good for business. Distracting Ethiopians and the international community with large expensive and year-long Millennium parties is now crucial. Mengistu attempted such a distraction with a large celebration of the tenth anniversary of the revolution, thereby setting off his own demise. Is Meles so inspired by Mengistu’s old strategies that he will do the same?
