Ethio - US Relations: Going Anywhere?

In 1973, the United States government decided to withdraw from its base at Kagnew in Asmara. This move, partly precipitated by a need to avoid a confrontation with the USSR in the horn, started to push Ethiopia into the Soviet sphere. Assured of US disinterest in Ethiopia, the USSR continued to arm Somalia to a point that the latter felt it could realize its dream for a Greater Somalia - an idea the British had nurtured long before the days of decolonization, and one that had seen Ethiopia and Somalia in military confrontation in 1964. Together with the rebellion in Eritrea (which received support from Arab nationalism which was itself being supported by the Soviets) and the Somali invasion, American refusal to supply arms, including those already paid for, assured Ethiopia’s turn for support towards the Soviet Union. The disengagement by the US at the time had meant it saw little value in its involvement in Ethiopia; it was later to regret its decision.

That was then - today’s realities in the horn are much different. Somalia’s state structure has failed and the US has every interest in controlling that dynamics and what happens inside Somalia. The 1993 experience there has made direct interference a political impossibility. To the west, oil rich Sudan is mired in conflict, and unfriendly to the US. Despite the egregious human suffering the Sudanese regime is perpetrating, it has so far succeeded in rebuffing attempts for international involvement. Wary that western presence in Sudan would infringe on its economic interests, China is unwilling to give the US or affiliated powers a foothold in the Sudan. Eritrea’s regime, after initial flirtation, has turned away from the US. Ethiopia remains the sole sizable country in the horn that has friendly relations with the US.

Unfortunately, the US administration seems to think that this friendly relationship with Ethiopia can continue only so long as Meles remains in power. It is true that a different leadership in Ethiopia may be more cognizant of what is in the national interest of Ethiopia than Meles is, and in this regard may not act at the whims of the US. But that fear can not justify the support of a tyrant who is looking like a new-age colonial viceroy with each passing day. When the US Charge d’Affairs goes around declaring Meles has won the election, or when she actively engages in the creation of a new political party to weaken opposition to Meles, Ethiopians have to wonder if he indeed is not just that.

The backing Meles gets from the governments of the US or the UK is markedly lacking from the population in his own country. Misguided, Meles’ few supporters have often seized upon ambassadors’ statements as vindication of their righteous position. Only denial can foster such a perspective. When leaders have no support from their local constituents and maximum support from outsiders, it requires no genius to decipher what their role is. It is often necessary to remind ones self that altruism never has a place in foreign relations.

Just as in the 1970s the US runs the risk of losing its position in Ethiopia - this time not by disengagement, but by an overzealous engagement to uphold the rule of a tyrant. When in the 17th century Emperor Susenyos converted to Catholicism, opening the door for wider influence from the Roman Catholic Church, the reaction was strong - he was forced to abdicate and for 100 years thereon, the country lived isolated. Though isolationism may today seem like an unlikely event, the level of distrust being festered by the Charge d’Affairs as well as the State Department’s active policies encourage just such a move, or at least a turn away from American domination. An Ethiopian saying goes - sooner or later Meles’ time will come to an end, Ethiopians will persevere till that day comes. For the US and its far reaching global interests, losing what could be a friendly ally and long term partner for short term domination is very likely ill advised.

What is the State Department thinking?

A new CUDP (Kinijit) is in the process of being formed. Those leading this effort are individuals who have now joined parliament against their party’s original decision to boycott. Their meeting took place just two days after the U.S. Charge d’Affairs to Ethiopia gave a peculiar press conference where she praised the Meles government for its “decision to accept the opposition Coalition for Unity and Democracy as a legal party” and at the same time called on the government and the opposition (mainly the CUD, whose entire leadership is in prison) to commit to the political process. Since Ms. Huddleston is fully aware of the political space that is available for the imprisoned leaders, we can only assume that she is referring to a newly constituted CUDP that excludes the imprisoned leaders.

Meles’ motive in this regard is clear; with the entire leadership of the CUDP in prison, a new Party made of people that have acquiesced to his demands to join parliament would be more manageable and can go a long way to restore his “democratic” credentials. It is no coincidence that the bearer of this “good news” is the Charge d’Affairs who has been working tirelessly to ensure a “vibrant” but hollow parliament. Cushioned in appeasing words for supporters of the real CUDP, her statement was read as a change of heart in the U.S. administration’s position. But in reality when the EPRDF or Ms. Huddleston said CUDP will be recognized, neither meant the original party but rather a new fabrication that includes some members of the original.

It is no wonder then that as part of her speech, the Charge d’Affairs instead of calling for the release of the prisoners merely expressed a wish that they would be released, and called for the continuation of the pseudo-legal theatrics that Meles is orchestrating. Surely Ms. Huddleston is aware that wishes alone will not pressure Meles into releasing anyone. By going on the record to state that the courts should decide the issue [quickly or not], she is saying that the U.S. administration washes its hands off the same individuals that Amnesty International calls prisoners of conscious. It can not be lost on her or the State Department that such a move will only give Meles a free hand to keep the true leaders of CUDP languishing in prison and out of the picture. In the mean time, those whom Meles believes can be kept in check are allowed to hijack the party that had gained so much popular support.

We think that the move by the Ethiopian government and the speech by the Ambassador are precipitated by the need to release some of the pressure building up against Meles in the U.S. Congress due to HR 4423. That the speech by Huddleston was made just a few days after Yamamoto testified at the subcommittee hearing is further evidence that this is an out strategy for Meles. The State department and Congress are on two opposing paths in regards to Ethiopia. If HR 4423 was to pass as law, it would seriously diminish what the administration can do for Meles. Aware of this dilemma the path chosen by the State Department is to encourage Meles to solve the problem but in a way that suits him. The EPRDF is skilled at creating Political Parties that hijack the will of the people and are totally under its influence. It is sad that the State Department and the U.S. embassy would find a move which effectively allows Meles to choose who can be an opposition worthy of praise. Neither the speech by Huddleston in regards to the court process nor allowing an EPRDF made CUDP to operate will solve the current impasse. We have to wonder, what is the State Department thinking?