Last week’s shenanigan by the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, at the South African summit of Progressive leaders was shameful to say the least. In Orwellian tongue he accepted Ethiopia’s Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, as a progressive leader. He then proceeded to characterize Ethiopia’s brutal experience of the last seven months as a mere over reaction by a government that behaved within the bounds of normal democratic practice. He raised neither international nor human rights paradigms as a point of reference for his characterization and simply blurted it out in a vacuum of context and honesty.
In fact, unprincipled chicanery of English officials in their policies regarding Ethiopia is not unprecedented. The breach in agreement between the government of Great Britain and Ethiopia during Emperor Yohannes’ reign as well as the contortions that London had to go through to legitimize the Fascist invasion of Ethiopia prior to WWII and its colonial ambitions later on present great lessons in the history of relations between the two nations.
In the late 1860s an English expeditionary force was sent to Ethiopia to crush the rule of Emperor Tewodros. He was seen as a threat to British interests as he asserted his independence and pursued a tightly controlled project of nation building. The facilitator to the expedition in Ethiopia, the later Emperor Yohannes, was to receive lavish arms and diplomatic support during his rule in the 1870s and 80s for his support in the British adventure. This came at a high price however.
British policy in the region was geared towards securing the Red Sea and Suez Canal as well as establishing functional colonies in Egypt and The Sudan. Another nationalist movement in the form of the Mahdists was presenting major obstacles in The Sudan resulting in Emperor Yohannes being contracted yet again to secure an exit route for the defeated Egyptian forces through Eritrea and the Red Sea as well as for he himself to apply military pressure on the Sudanese from the South East. In return the British promised that the Egyptian held port of Massawa would remain open to him while he could control much of highland Eritrea and the western lowlands up to Kassala.
While the Emperor seemed to fulfill his side of the bargain, the British proceeded to invite the Italians into Eritrea as a way of securing their interests. The sense of betrayal was to stay with the Emperor until his death in one such battle with the Mahdists. To the Emperor, the British behavior was slimy while to the British it was pragmatic.
During the mid 1930s the British were to impress another Ethiopian Emperor with their ever more ingenious gimmicks. Hitler’s rise to power in Europe had France and England, the traditional leaders in Europe, in a condition of panic and despair. One element that they believed would deter Hitler was to keep Italy on their side of the confrontation as they had done during the WWI. Ethiopia was a member of the League of Nations and invoked the principle of collective security at the time that Mussolini attempted his invasion but France and England literally turned a blind eye or worse, supported him.
Eventually the British were to work hard at recognizing the Fascist invasion and the expulsion of Ethiopia from the League of Nations while still maintaining an overt policy of collective security. The fact that the British gave Emperor Haile Selassie harbor during the war had less to do with their interest in protecting Ethiopian sovereignty as it did with acquiring a negotiating chip against Mussolini who desired the submission of the Emperor to legitimize his rule. The British impulse to play on all sides of diplomacy in total disregard to international law and common norms came at a great cost to Ethiopia as well as Great Britain itself. Finally, it is worth mentioning that British colonial ambitions in Ethiopia after the War were crushed only by the involvement of the US, leaving the Emperor forever suspicious of the English character.
Tony Blair’s support of Meles Zenawi as a progressive leader while the latter punishes Ethiopians with poverty and bullets is therefore a continuation of a long history of hypocrisy in British policy towards Ethiopia. The fact that British policy has the same traits when the country was a world power [1880s], on the brink of a global war [1930s] and at this time when it is a small client state to the US is troubling.
At a time when most African countries have shunned British influence in their affairs, it is understandable that Blair should be grappling for any strand of support in the continent. But maybe it is best if he does it in silence without pompous invitations of brutal leaders to his summits and commissions.
In fact, unprincipled chicanery of English officials in their policies regarding Ethiopia is not unprecedented. The breach in agreement between the government of Great Britain and Ethiopia during Emperor Yohannes’ reign as well as the contortions that London had to go through to legitimize the Fascist invasion of Ethiopia prior to WWII and its colonial ambitions later on present great lessons in the history of relations between the two nations.
In the late 1860s an English expeditionary force was sent to Ethiopia to crush the rule of Emperor Tewodros. He was seen as a threat to British interests as he asserted his independence and pursued a tightly controlled project of nation building. The facilitator to the expedition in Ethiopia, the later Emperor Yohannes, was to receive lavish arms and diplomatic support during his rule in the 1870s and 80s for his support in the British adventure. This came at a high price however.
British policy in the region was geared towards securing the Red Sea and Suez Canal as well as establishing functional colonies in Egypt and The Sudan. Another nationalist movement in the form of the Mahdists was presenting major obstacles in The Sudan resulting in Emperor Yohannes being contracted yet again to secure an exit route for the defeated Egyptian forces through Eritrea and the Red Sea as well as for he himself to apply military pressure on the Sudanese from the South East. In return the British promised that the Egyptian held port of Massawa would remain open to him while he could control much of highland Eritrea and the western lowlands up to Kassala.
While the Emperor seemed to fulfill his side of the bargain, the British proceeded to invite the Italians into Eritrea as a way of securing their interests. The sense of betrayal was to stay with the Emperor until his death in one such battle with the Mahdists. To the Emperor, the British behavior was slimy while to the British it was pragmatic.
During the mid 1930s the British were to impress another Ethiopian Emperor with their ever more ingenious gimmicks. Hitler’s rise to power in Europe had France and England, the traditional leaders in Europe, in a condition of panic and despair. One element that they believed would deter Hitler was to keep Italy on their side of the confrontation as they had done during the WWI. Ethiopia was a member of the League of Nations and invoked the principle of collective security at the time that Mussolini attempted his invasion but France and England literally turned a blind eye or worse, supported him.
Eventually the British were to work hard at recognizing the Fascist invasion and the expulsion of Ethiopia from the League of Nations while still maintaining an overt policy of collective security. The fact that the British gave Emperor Haile Selassie harbor during the war had less to do with their interest in protecting Ethiopian sovereignty as it did with acquiring a negotiating chip against Mussolini who desired the submission of the Emperor to legitimize his rule. The British impulse to play on all sides of diplomacy in total disregard to international law and common norms came at a great cost to Ethiopia as well as Great Britain itself. Finally, it is worth mentioning that British colonial ambitions in Ethiopia after the War were crushed only by the involvement of the US, leaving the Emperor forever suspicious of the English character.
Tony Blair’s support of Meles Zenawi as a progressive leader while the latter punishes Ethiopians with poverty and bullets is therefore a continuation of a long history of hypocrisy in British policy towards Ethiopia. The fact that British policy has the same traits when the country was a world power [1880s], on the brink of a global war [1930s] and at this time when it is a small client state to the US is troubling.
At a time when most African countries have shunned British influence in their affairs, it is understandable that Blair should be grappling for any strand of support in the continent. But maybe it is best if he does it in silence without pompous invitations of brutal leaders to his summits and commissions.
