Siad Barre, Somalia’s last president, made a blunder when he decided to go to war with Ethiopia in 1977. Not only did he initiate the deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union, a formidable arms supplier, but he also gave Ethiopia’s then leader, Mengistu Hailemariam, the context within which he could militarize his revolution.
Mengistu’s militarization of Ethiopia’s revolution forever changed the nature of the revolt from a civilian one supported by the Military to a Military one forced onto civilians. The Somalia war became the central element with which Mengistu and his supporters gained legitimacy by denouncing civilian revolutionaries as weak potential rulers who couldn’t protect their country from external aggression. The same war also gave him free reign to invite Soviet intervention in the arming and running of military operations and the governance system as a whole, thus imposing a quasi colonial relationship.
It seems that Meles has been a good student of history. He has done all that is in his power to provoke the Somalis to declare war on Ethiopia with the same hopes of gaining domestic legitimacy and external military support. The fact that there is no formidable Somali government, military or immediate threat to Ethiopia has made his job much harder than Mengistu’s. He has literally had to partially invade Somalia to get mostly empty threats from Somali Islamists, who can at best remove his soldiers from some Somali territory.
Unlike 1977, Ethiopians are not readily mobilizing for Meles’ war. Most seem to have read the Somali threat for what it is - non existent. The external actors for whose benefit he’s orchestrating this hoopla however seem to have been taken by it all. Most western policy makers are surely a lot more naïve than the Ethiopian populace when it comes to reading the motivation of Ethiopian leaders. For instance, it has still not sunk in for most US policy makers that to support Ethiopia in Meles’ provocative invasions of Somalia can only strengthen the Islamic court by giving it a lot more legitimacy than it could muster on its own.
Of course, at the end of the day, local people alone will decide the final outcomes of political and military confrontations. Both Ethiopians and Somalis will end up supporting leaders of their choosing. The challenge lies in convincing the west that this is better done using democratic means rather than war lords, militias and guerilla forces. Supporting Ethiopia’s democratic process will have incredibly more yield than supporting its internal and external security operations. It avoids the death and suffering of millions and does not discourage economic development, health initiatives and schooling.
Ethiopia’s relationship with countries in the region has shifted with time. Historically political and economic interests have driven the cooperations and confrontations. Rearticulating these relationships around the concept of religion is a formula that can only work to defeat the essence of Ethiopia which is a country consisting of a great deal of diversity.
A constant barrage from western media about Ethiopia being an old Christian civilization that has to defend itself from Islamic Somalia is false at many levels. Emperor Menelik confidently accepted a diverse empire that was inclusive of many Islamic emirs. Furthermore, Ethiopia has lived as a neighbor to Saudi Arabia, a declared Islamic state for generations. It is time to accept that for the most part, if at all, the Somalis are becoming radical not despite Ethiopia but because of its actions.
Mengistu’s militarization of Ethiopia’s revolution forever changed the nature of the revolt from a civilian one supported by the Military to a Military one forced onto civilians. The Somalia war became the central element with which Mengistu and his supporters gained legitimacy by denouncing civilian revolutionaries as weak potential rulers who couldn’t protect their country from external aggression. The same war also gave him free reign to invite Soviet intervention in the arming and running of military operations and the governance system as a whole, thus imposing a quasi colonial relationship.
It seems that Meles has been a good student of history. He has done all that is in his power to provoke the Somalis to declare war on Ethiopia with the same hopes of gaining domestic legitimacy and external military support. The fact that there is no formidable Somali government, military or immediate threat to Ethiopia has made his job much harder than Mengistu’s. He has literally had to partially invade Somalia to get mostly empty threats from Somali Islamists, who can at best remove his soldiers from some Somali territory.
Unlike 1977, Ethiopians are not readily mobilizing for Meles’ war. Most seem to have read the Somali threat for what it is - non existent. The external actors for whose benefit he’s orchestrating this hoopla however seem to have been taken by it all. Most western policy makers are surely a lot more naïve than the Ethiopian populace when it comes to reading the motivation of Ethiopian leaders. For instance, it has still not sunk in for most US policy makers that to support Ethiopia in Meles’ provocative invasions of Somalia can only strengthen the Islamic court by giving it a lot more legitimacy than it could muster on its own.
Of course, at the end of the day, local people alone will decide the final outcomes of political and military confrontations. Both Ethiopians and Somalis will end up supporting leaders of their choosing. The challenge lies in convincing the west that this is better done using democratic means rather than war lords, militias and guerilla forces. Supporting Ethiopia’s democratic process will have incredibly more yield than supporting its internal and external security operations. It avoids the death and suffering of millions and does not discourage economic development, health initiatives and schooling.
Ethiopia’s relationship with countries in the region has shifted with time. Historically political and economic interests have driven the cooperations and confrontations. Rearticulating these relationships around the concept of religion is a formula that can only work to defeat the essence of Ethiopia which is a country consisting of a great deal of diversity.
A constant barrage from western media about Ethiopia being an old Christian civilization that has to defend itself from Islamic Somalia is false at many levels. Emperor Menelik confidently accepted a diverse empire that was inclusive of many Islamic emirs. Furthermore, Ethiopia has lived as a neighbor to Saudi Arabia, a declared Islamic state for generations. It is time to accept that for the most part, if at all, the Somalis are becoming radical not despite Ethiopia but because of its actions.
6 comments:
brilliant!
He has done all that is in his power to provoke the Somalis to declare war on Ethiopia with the same hopes of gaining domestic legitimacy and external military support.
This is a great point, external tension with that of somalia & Eritrea does bring a certain legitimacy...
And a lot of people are missing this point...
This is a must reading for all Ethioipians.
Excellent and mature analysis.
I really enjoyed reading this blog entry. Keep it up! We miss you when you are gone too long. I wonder though, is it possible that instead of the US being "naive" as to the Ethiopian government's agenda in Somalia, it is US interests driving the agenda?
This is a great analysis and thank you. I don't think that US is that naive either.
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