Since the Ethio-Eritrean war of 1998, the TPLF dominated EPRDF has been using the Assab issue as bait to catch votes of support from Ethiopians who otherwise are poised against the party. In fact it could be said that EPRDF was able to lengthen its rule over Ethiopia by over half a decade simply by using the ever sensitive Eritrean issue as a way of galvanizing support. EPRDF is of course not the first Ethiopian government to find many Ethiopian?s misgivings about Eritrea to be a convenient way to distract from non-Eritrean issues. But the present ruling party, unlike the Dergue, has taken it to a new level because it has lost political legitimacy on all other fronts.
Many have accurately stated that the Badme issue is properly a non-issue. EPRDF's attempt to keep it alive through various initiatives is part of its ploy to balance regional power centers while retaining a dominating position. It has found an ambiguous partner in this in the Eritrean government which finds it hard to extricate itself from a dilemma of its own making. If one were to carry out a realistic analysis of the present condition, one would find that it is inconceivable that Eritreans do not want to come to an agreement with Ethiopians on Ethiopian access to the Red Sea through the port of Assab. This would probably happen within the first few months of a legitimate, non TPLF government taking power in Ethiopia.
This type of agreement requires the assumption of power in Ethiopia of a government that would like to use Assab as a port and not as a sole means of attaining legitimacy among Ethiopians by forever "fighting for Assab". In other words, an agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea on a viable Ethiopian use of Assab would spell the end of any illegitimate political force in Ethiopia and EPRDF falls in this category.
The going premise in EPRDF leadership circles is that Ethiopians, and particularly those from central regions, will always jump on a bandwagon that has something to do with retaking Eritrea. The reality as it exists simply does not allow for such an adventure however since it is politically unviable to ask the Ethiopian and Eritrean people to re-live what they have experienced in the past fifty years. Henceforth unity is going to come naturally and not through force. More importantly however, central Ethiopians have rejected the leadership?s premise completely in more recent times.
This premise was recently shattered as Ethiopians rejected EPRDF and claimed that they do not need illegitimate representatives to negotiate agreements with the Eritrean people over issues of economic or political nature. As an old Ethiopian saying goes, የፉክክር ቤት ሳይዘጋ ያድራል (ye'fukikir bet sayzega yadral) - while Ethiopians and Eritreans are focused on non issues that could easily be resolved by legitimate governments, both are headed to be the first successful colonies in Africa where no agreement between them will ever mean anything substantial in the future. Ethiopian history of the 19th century clearly demonstrates that battles for control among siblings can easily lead to loss of control to an outsider. Who in their right mind would want a repeat of that?
Many have accurately stated that the Badme issue is properly a non-issue. EPRDF's attempt to keep it alive through various initiatives is part of its ploy to balance regional power centers while retaining a dominating position. It has found an ambiguous partner in this in the Eritrean government which finds it hard to extricate itself from a dilemma of its own making. If one were to carry out a realistic analysis of the present condition, one would find that it is inconceivable that Eritreans do not want to come to an agreement with Ethiopians on Ethiopian access to the Red Sea through the port of Assab. This would probably happen within the first few months of a legitimate, non TPLF government taking power in Ethiopia.
This type of agreement requires the assumption of power in Ethiopia of a government that would like to use Assab as a port and not as a sole means of attaining legitimacy among Ethiopians by forever "fighting for Assab". In other words, an agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea on a viable Ethiopian use of Assab would spell the end of any illegitimate political force in Ethiopia and EPRDF falls in this category.
The going premise in EPRDF leadership circles is that Ethiopians, and particularly those from central regions, will always jump on a bandwagon that has something to do with retaking Eritrea. The reality as it exists simply does not allow for such an adventure however since it is politically unviable to ask the Ethiopian and Eritrean people to re-live what they have experienced in the past fifty years. Henceforth unity is going to come naturally and not through force. More importantly however, central Ethiopians have rejected the leadership?s premise completely in more recent times.
This premise was recently shattered as Ethiopians rejected EPRDF and claimed that they do not need illegitimate representatives to negotiate agreements with the Eritrean people over issues of economic or political nature. As an old Ethiopian saying goes, የፉክክር ቤት ሳይዘጋ ያድራል (ye'fukikir bet sayzega yadral) - while Ethiopians and Eritreans are focused on non issues that could easily be resolved by legitimate governments, both are headed to be the first successful colonies in Africa where no agreement between them will ever mean anything substantial in the future. Ethiopian history of the 19th century clearly demonstrates that battles for control among siblings can easily lead to loss of control to an outsider. Who in their right mind would want a repeat of that?
5 comments:
One of the keys in our 'foreign office war' is being able to make it clear that we think Meles must abide by the Border Commission's ruling. This is one of the means of shattering that myth pervasive throughout donor governments and NGO's that the Ethiopian opposition and democracy activists are reactionaries who would tomorrow go to war with Eritrea.
Once there is democracy, things will get sorted out appropriately. Assab vs. democracy is no contest at all.
If only you read what the village idiots at aigaforum wrote on their main page.
1: Badme is an issue only because woyane needs it to be an issue.
2. Algiers is now CUDs fault? I thought it was Seyoum and Meles who signed away every leverage Ethiopia had at Algiers.
3: Humera is in Gonder, has always been, until Meles re-christened it "western" Tigray.
Ende woyane achebchabi yastelagne sew yelem ahuns.
"Ende woyane achebchabi yastelagne sew yelem ahuns."
Do we have to expect every opinion to be in favor of the opposition or against the EPRDF? How about the people who voted for it? Shouldn't they have their opinion like the rest of us?
yyyy,
I have a right to hate ye woyane achebchabi just like they have a right to hate me :) ho ho demo bezih timetubin ende?
If we were to contribute something of value and really concerned over the extreme poverty, we would try help the millions of Ethiopians living in total destitution than trying to justify our hate toward others. what good could come out of hate?
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