The Need for Redefining Ethiopian Nationalism
The formation of modern Ethiopia was initiated by Emperor Tewodros as he attempted to consolidate his rule over as large an area as possible in what was historically known as Abyssinia. Considering that this area did not contain large urban centers it is difficult to call this the beginning of the formation of Ethiopia as a nation-state.
Europe was itself going through this process in the middle of the 19th century except that its urban bourgeois class defined the structure of the state while most of the notions of nation were defined by ethnicity. The notion of nation-states that did not have ethnic hegemonies was indeed rare. The fact that not all of Europe turned into republic states can not take away from the crucial role that the urban classes played in this process.
The same era defined the modern introduction of European interest in the Red sea and the horn in general – partly as a consequence of British interests in the Suez Canal and trade with Asia. The Emperor’s attempts had much to do with the amount of new European arms that had started flowing into the region and the imbalance that this created, disrupting the equilibrium that existed before then between local lords.
The Emperor’s methods of securing support ranged from liberation to suppression but had much in common with what was being observed in other parts of the world at the time. He attempted to accentuate the old Abyssinian unifying values but was always careful to keep the old institutions of church and landlords in check as they represented the classes that needed to be sacrificed to bring about social transformation.
Despite these attempts at forging a nation-state, the Emperor’s efforts set in motion a dynamics that established Ethiopia as an important empire that, unlike Europe’s colonial empires, did not have a nucleus of a nation-state in it. Europeans, and particularly the British and French, kept arms flowing to various regions within the Ethiopian Empire blocking any chance of building a central authority.
This made the structure of modern Ethiopia more like that of the Ottoman Empire than that of the competing west European empires of the 19th century. Positively this made Ethiopia much more ‘democratic’ in allowing expression of interest in various regions compared to European empires, but this was impossible to demonstrate as the most lavishly financed parts of Ethiopia could not compete economically with the most neglected parts of European colonies. It is important to remember that this was caused more by the marked difference in economic advances rather than political structure of these empires however.
Showan hegemony at the beginning of the 20th century came closest to starting the process of forming a state structure but Emperor Menelik’s vision also came to naught as the confrontation between west and central Europe over their economic/political interests compromised Ethiopia’s sovereignty until the final attack by Fascist Italy in 1935.
The centralizing effect of the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, through the provision of infrastructure and governance systems, finally resulted in the Ethiopia of the 1940s where an externally weakened Emperor Haile Selassie had more control over Ethiopia than any ruler before him. The price was steep however. His external weakness, due to the military support that he had accepted from the UK/US, seemed to put him in a position where he had to accept his place in the hierarchy of global power and give up on the historic quest for Ethiopian modernization through the structures of nation-statehood.
This also marked the beginning of an era when the whole world, including Europe, was being consolidated under two polar powers dominated by the USSR and the US. For Ethiopia it spelled the beginning of half a century of governance where control over internal dissent was becoming harsh and unforgiving but the need for an external sponsor in one of the two superpowers was critical for any government in power.
The first major opportunity that came at the same time as the Emperor’s choice of the US as his sponsor was the onset of Arab nationalism and the threat that this posed to the west. This made the long espoused wish of Ethiopia for an outlet to the sea a possibility by aligning its interest with those who wished to contain the anti-colonial sentiment of the Arabs. Eritrea’s acquisition not only brought internal prestige to Ethiopia’s government but also provided an economic impetus by securing Eritrean industrial capacity – capital and labor – and ports.
These positive developments were soon to be clouded by doubt however. Ethiopia’s ambiguous existence as the modern manifestation of an old empire seemed unsustainable. Again the first negative impact of this was felt in Eritrea where the federal arrangement that both Christian and Muslim Eritreans had accepted in 1952 was dissolved as the Ethiopian government found it impossible to effectively absorb a federal state under its prevailing structure. Furthermore, the growing urban intelligentsia in the country started agitating for political participation and this was also met with stonewalling measures. These tensions boiled over into open armed rebellion in Eritrea while they formed the basis for much instability in all the major cities of Ethiopia leading up to the revolution.
As Arabs worked to break the western stronghold over themselves, they tried to undermine the Ethiopian Emperor using the Eritrean insurrection but failed in most of these quests as their revolution was contained and transformed into various Islamic movements by the 1970s. In addition, the ‘thaw’ in relations between the US and the USSR combined with the end of the post war economic boom in the west to cut Ethiopia off from most western support.
The chaos that ensued in Ethiopia invited the Soviet involvement in the country’s affairs and military and totally undermined whatever remaining independence the state had. This created the total destruction of civilian revolutionary movements, established conditions for the resurgence of Eritrean nationalism and encouraged an ethnic Tigray movement. The opportunity that the revolution presented for the formation of a national consensus was quickly usurped by the Soviets as they militarized Ethiopia’s governance. What appeared to be another opportunity at nation-statehood was lost yet again.
The dramatic reduction in Ethiopia’s ability to negotiate its interest with major powers over the century was due to two major trends. One was Ethiopia’s inability to form an effective state structure and an inclusive nationalism, while the other was the growing consolidation in global governance and hierarchy. This second trend has been totally ignored in most studies that pertain to Ethiopia but probably has as much to do with Ethiopian governance problems as the more commonly known domestic failure above.
An important impact of this second trend has been that more recent Ethiopian governments have managed to stay in power more as agents of greater powers – as controllers of their populations and their region whenever they could – rather than as representatives of their people and the state. The ex US ambassador to Ethiopia, David Shinn, put it succinctly when he was witnessing for a congressional committee recently by stating that the primary reason why Ethiopia was crucial to US national interests was its “effective national security system.”
The question of why a Turkey like state did not emerge out of the Ethiopian empire of the 19th century can probably be explained by the difference in economic and political advancement between the two empires. But a persisting question is why one can not emerge at this time when Ethiopia does have the required advances. Is the global power structure too rigidly set to allow for the rise of more nation-states or is this made impossible due to Ethiopians’ – particularly the intelligentsia – lack of willingness to go through a paradigm shift?
For this paradigm shift to occur, Ethiopia’s interests and nationalism must be defined on much more solid grounds than the fleeting ethnic based entitlement logic or anti-Eritrea/Somalia fear rhetoric. If this paradigm shift does not occur, it probably means that most of Ethiopia’s leaders – both in power and outside – have accepted the premise that Ethiopia is not viable as a state. The present Ethiopian condition is a clear demonstration of where this premise leads. The attempt of any group will always remain to be to attain power in Ethiopia’s government structure, since that position provides the highest returns from global powers by providing the ability to act as an agent.
Statehood is attained by the natural dynamics of domestic interests vying for power while still answerable to their domestic constituencies. This need not be in the form of voting, but a democratic political structure presents one of the acceptable ways of doing this.
At the end of the day what is desired for growth to occur is for those in power to have, in the best of their interest the growth of the capacity of their population. This capacity growth generally takes the form of a population being able to produce much of what it consumes thereby initiating industrialization and national wealth accumulation that can be reinvested for more growth. Agent governments can not allow this to happen since it goes totally contrary to their interest in all respects. The question thus remains. We know under what premise the TPLF operates but are all Ethiopians inadvertently operating under that same premise? In other words, is this a TPLF problem or one of a need for paradigm shift by all?
Europe was itself going through this process in the middle of the 19th century except that its urban bourgeois class defined the structure of the state while most of the notions of nation were defined by ethnicity. The notion of nation-states that did not have ethnic hegemonies was indeed rare. The fact that not all of Europe turned into republic states can not take away from the crucial role that the urban classes played in this process.
The same era defined the modern introduction of European interest in the Red sea and the horn in general – partly as a consequence of British interests in the Suez Canal and trade with Asia. The Emperor’s attempts had much to do with the amount of new European arms that had started flowing into the region and the imbalance that this created, disrupting the equilibrium that existed before then between local lords.
The Emperor’s methods of securing support ranged from liberation to suppression but had much in common with what was being observed in other parts of the world at the time. He attempted to accentuate the old Abyssinian unifying values but was always careful to keep the old institutions of church and landlords in check as they represented the classes that needed to be sacrificed to bring about social transformation.
Despite these attempts at forging a nation-state, the Emperor’s efforts set in motion a dynamics that established Ethiopia as an important empire that, unlike Europe’s colonial empires, did not have a nucleus of a nation-state in it. Europeans, and particularly the British and French, kept arms flowing to various regions within the Ethiopian Empire blocking any chance of building a central authority.
This made the structure of modern Ethiopia more like that of the Ottoman Empire than that of the competing west European empires of the 19th century. Positively this made Ethiopia much more ‘democratic’ in allowing expression of interest in various regions compared to European empires, but this was impossible to demonstrate as the most lavishly financed parts of Ethiopia could not compete economically with the most neglected parts of European colonies. It is important to remember that this was caused more by the marked difference in economic advances rather than political structure of these empires however.
Showan hegemony at the beginning of the 20th century came closest to starting the process of forming a state structure but Emperor Menelik’s vision also came to naught as the confrontation between west and central Europe over their economic/political interests compromised Ethiopia’s sovereignty until the final attack by Fascist Italy in 1935.
The centralizing effect of the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, through the provision of infrastructure and governance systems, finally resulted in the Ethiopia of the 1940s where an externally weakened Emperor Haile Selassie had more control over Ethiopia than any ruler before him. The price was steep however. His external weakness, due to the military support that he had accepted from the UK/US, seemed to put him in a position where he had to accept his place in the hierarchy of global power and give up on the historic quest for Ethiopian modernization through the structures of nation-statehood.
This also marked the beginning of an era when the whole world, including Europe, was being consolidated under two polar powers dominated by the USSR and the US. For Ethiopia it spelled the beginning of half a century of governance where control over internal dissent was becoming harsh and unforgiving but the need for an external sponsor in one of the two superpowers was critical for any government in power.
The first major opportunity that came at the same time as the Emperor’s choice of the US as his sponsor was the onset of Arab nationalism and the threat that this posed to the west. This made the long espoused wish of Ethiopia for an outlet to the sea a possibility by aligning its interest with those who wished to contain the anti-colonial sentiment of the Arabs. Eritrea’s acquisition not only brought internal prestige to Ethiopia’s government but also provided an economic impetus by securing Eritrean industrial capacity – capital and labor – and ports.
These positive developments were soon to be clouded by doubt however. Ethiopia’s ambiguous existence as the modern manifestation of an old empire seemed unsustainable. Again the first negative impact of this was felt in Eritrea where the federal arrangement that both Christian and Muslim Eritreans had accepted in 1952 was dissolved as the Ethiopian government found it impossible to effectively absorb a federal state under its prevailing structure. Furthermore, the growing urban intelligentsia in the country started agitating for political participation and this was also met with stonewalling measures. These tensions boiled over into open armed rebellion in Eritrea while they formed the basis for much instability in all the major cities of Ethiopia leading up to the revolution.
As Arabs worked to break the western stronghold over themselves, they tried to undermine the Ethiopian Emperor using the Eritrean insurrection but failed in most of these quests as their revolution was contained and transformed into various Islamic movements by the 1970s. In addition, the ‘thaw’ in relations between the US and the USSR combined with the end of the post war economic boom in the west to cut Ethiopia off from most western support.
The chaos that ensued in Ethiopia invited the Soviet involvement in the country’s affairs and military and totally undermined whatever remaining independence the state had. This created the total destruction of civilian revolutionary movements, established conditions for the resurgence of Eritrean nationalism and encouraged an ethnic Tigray movement. The opportunity that the revolution presented for the formation of a national consensus was quickly usurped by the Soviets as they militarized Ethiopia’s governance. What appeared to be another opportunity at nation-statehood was lost yet again.
The dramatic reduction in Ethiopia’s ability to negotiate its interest with major powers over the century was due to two major trends. One was Ethiopia’s inability to form an effective state structure and an inclusive nationalism, while the other was the growing consolidation in global governance and hierarchy. This second trend has been totally ignored in most studies that pertain to Ethiopia but probably has as much to do with Ethiopian governance problems as the more commonly known domestic failure above.
An important impact of this second trend has been that more recent Ethiopian governments have managed to stay in power more as agents of greater powers – as controllers of their populations and their region whenever they could – rather than as representatives of their people and the state. The ex US ambassador to Ethiopia, David Shinn, put it succinctly when he was witnessing for a congressional committee recently by stating that the primary reason why Ethiopia was crucial to US national interests was its “effective national security system.”
The question of why a Turkey like state did not emerge out of the Ethiopian empire of the 19th century can probably be explained by the difference in economic and political advancement between the two empires. But a persisting question is why one can not emerge at this time when Ethiopia does have the required advances. Is the global power structure too rigidly set to allow for the rise of more nation-states or is this made impossible due to Ethiopians’ – particularly the intelligentsia – lack of willingness to go through a paradigm shift?
For this paradigm shift to occur, Ethiopia’s interests and nationalism must be defined on much more solid grounds than the fleeting ethnic based entitlement logic or anti-Eritrea/Somalia fear rhetoric. If this paradigm shift does not occur, it probably means that most of Ethiopia’s leaders – both in power and outside – have accepted the premise that Ethiopia is not viable as a state. The present Ethiopian condition is a clear demonstration of where this premise leads. The attempt of any group will always remain to be to attain power in Ethiopia’s government structure, since that position provides the highest returns from global powers by providing the ability to act as an agent.
Statehood is attained by the natural dynamics of domestic interests vying for power while still answerable to their domestic constituencies. This need not be in the form of voting, but a democratic political structure presents one of the acceptable ways of doing this.
At the end of the day what is desired for growth to occur is for those in power to have, in the best of their interest the growth of the capacity of their population. This capacity growth generally takes the form of a population being able to produce much of what it consumes thereby initiating industrialization and national wealth accumulation that can be reinvested for more growth. Agent governments can not allow this to happen since it goes totally contrary to their interest in all respects. The question thus remains. We know under what premise the TPLF operates but are all Ethiopians inadvertently operating under that same premise? In other words, is this a TPLF problem or one of a need for paradigm shift by all?
1 comments:
A very good article. I guess a big part of the problem now is how narrowly nationalism has come to be defined over the past few decades especially after the rise of TPLF. In part due to our very uncompromising nature, we are highly polarized on what we want for and out of Ethiopia. There ought to be some level of consensus in order to define what Ethiopianism ought to look like. Sadly, the way things are looking right now, the alliances that have recently formed mainly out of the need to oust TPLF do not seem ready to define this for us.
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